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PREFACE 
Hypertension has long been recognized as a significant 
health problem in Australia. Since the condition results in 
reduced life expectancy, and employability, requiring careful 
monitoring and life long therapy, the choice of treatments 
requires special care. Mild hypertension is symptomless, and 
accounts for seventy percent of all cases of hypertension. Most 
mild hypertensives are unaware of their condition. 
Chapter one of this dissertation is largely concerned with 
an outline of the pr~valence and the principal means of 
detection and treatment of the condition. The cost of lifelong 
drug therapy, currently the primary means of treatment, is high. 
A comparison with the alternative non-drug treatments is 
therefore called for. The aims of this analysis are consistent 
with guidelines for hypertension control recommended by the 
National Heart Foundation of Australia. 
The rest of chapter one, justifies the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in indicating the desirability or otherwise of 
government intervention in the market for health care. It is 
argued that market failure prevents individual decision makers 
from rationally evaluating the worth of their human capital. 
Market failure is evident in insurance, lifestyle and through 
the generation of externalities. The analysis should help to 
indicate whether a control programme is economically viable, 
which treatments should be used and who should be treated. 
Chapter two introduces the taxonomy of benefits and costs 
used i.e. direct and indirect, visible and invisible savings in 
morbidity and mortality, which are the major benefits of 
effective hypertension control. The human capital and 
willingness to pay approaches for valuation of life are 
examined. Both approaches can be drawn together when we view 
insurance and lifestyle as a reflection of individuals 
willingness to pay, to maintain and increase his own human 
capital. The permanent ipcome hypothesis can be used to justify 
valueing pensioners time at the market wage. We must assume that 
maximising Gross National Product (G.N.P.) does not provide a 
basis for human capital valuation. 
Choice of the real discount rate presents some 
difficulties. Arguments that it ought to reflect the social rate 
of time preference and the opportunity cost of capital are 
discussed. The use of the risk-free bond rate is viewed as a 
reliable proxy. 
Chapter three examines the benefits (averted costs) of 
effective control of mild hypertension. A mortality model is 
developed upon the basis of human capital valuation, yielding 
the present value of losses for the condition. The stock-flow 
considerations, largely ignored in other studies are examined. 
Morbidity costs are categorized by hospitalization, future 
treatment and loss in labour productivity. An understatement in 
estimates is likely given the difficulty in quantifying some 
indirect costs. 
Chapter four, follows a probabilistic approach in 
specifying the linkages between diagnosis, treatment and 
outcome. The costs of treatment consist of screening, drug 
treatment and the 'salt-modified' diet (non-drug treatment). 
Sensitivity analysis is performed upon two alternative treatment 
mixes i.e. diuretic drugs provide the primary course of 
treatment (the 70% assumption) and non-drug treatment as the 
initial therapy (the 20% ~ssumption). 
Chapter five reviews the findings of the cost-benefit 
analysis. In the aggregate social costs are outweighed by social 
benefits. A programme based upon salt-diet modification as the 
primary treatment yields the highest net benefit. Benefit cost 
ratios suggest that, ideally, the programme should be directed 
at males aged 65 to 69. 
Research procedures followed consisted primarily of a 
review of recent epidemiological studies performed in Australia, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Economic analysis, in 
hypertension research, has been confined largely to cost-
effective analyses. The increasing sophistication of cost-
effective analyses and their scope for capturing the 
nonpecuniary value of saving life, avoiding suffering etc, 
accounts for the growing usurpation of cost-benefit by cost 
effective analysis, in health care. 
More significantly, the use of quality-adjusted life years, 
as a measure of health output, provides information more readily 
appreciated by members of the medical profession, generally 
lacking formal training in economics. 
The Australian National Blood Pressure Study and the Risk 
Factor Prevalence Study (National Heart Foundation of Australia 
1980) were the primary sources of data. While information on 
mortality rates is available on an annual basis, very little is 
available on the incidence of non-fatal events i.e. for stroke 
and myocardial infarction. Estimates of hypertension related 
events were inferred. Dissaggregated data on deaths from heart 
and blood vessel disease, provided by the N.H.F., were received 
too late to be adequately incorporated. 
The benefits and efficacy of drug/non drug treatment of 
mild hypertension remains a contentious issue in epidemiological 
circles. The forthcoming Medical Research Council Trial (U.K.) 
should provide more exhaustive information regarding 
hypertensive related events, and age/sex related benefits of 
diuretic and beta-blocker therapy, than that currently 
available. 
The analysis undertaken is exploratory in nature. The 
findings largely confirm those views held by the medical 
profession for the need for concerted efforts at eradicating 
mild hypertension in Australia. 
The magnitude of the net benefits are particularly 
sensitive to choice of adherence-to-therapy probabilities and 
stock-flow modelling. A more complete analysis is required which 
incorporates sensitivity to adherence rates, and a purpose built 
demographic model. A cost-benefit program examining both blood 
pressure and cholesterol, as the major risk factors in 
heart,disease would be informative. 
I wish to thank Bob Rutherford, my supervisor, for 
assistance provided throughout the preparation of this thesis. 
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TAB IE OF CONTENTS 
TITlE 
INTRODUCTION 
PRINCIPlES AND IMPlEMENTATION 
COSTS OF MilD HYPERTENSION 
COSTS OF TREATMENT AND DETECTION 
REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND SENSITIVITY 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Hypertension (H.T.) is the sustained elevation of blood 
pressure in the human circulatory system. Mild hypertension 
(M.H.T.) falls within the range 90 to 109 mm Hg, diastolic. 
M.H.T., while asymptomatic, is a major correllate in the 
incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction (M.I.) and renal 
failure 1 • M.H.T. effects approximately 700,000 Australians who 
are currently unaware of the condition. 
M.H.T. is usuall'y detected by chance during routine 
superannuation, insurance or military examinations in males, or 
during pregnancy in females. The family general practitioner 
(G.P.) and mass screening, to a lesser degree, have been the 
principal means of detection. Of the total hypertensives in 
Australia only 33% of men and 61% of women are currently on 
medication. 
The incidence of M.H.T. is particularly high in middle 
aged males. The relative risk of M.H.T. related events (stroke 
and M.I.) is not significantly different, between males and 
females. 
Effective detection and control of mild hypertension in 
Australia, would produce benefits by averting costs that would 
otherwise be incurred. Individual's health benefits would be 
l 
realized in the form of increased life-expectancy, decreased 
morbidity and subsequent disability. Health resource savings 
would result from decreased incidence of events, with the 
associated utilization of medical resources. 
Current means of treatment entail the widespread use of 
drugs in gaining satisfactory levels of bloodpressure. The 
economic costs of lifelong pharmacological therapy, have given 
rise to an increasing emphasis on prevention of M.H.T. through 
modification of diet and lifestyle. The use of non-drug 
treatments for mild hypertensives (M.H.T.'s) is gaining 
acceptance, as the primary means of cure. KAPLAN [39,p7] 
recommends the modification of dietary sodium combined with the 
use of Beta-Blocker hypotensive drugs, rather than the standard 
high dose diuretic therapies. 
Two popular means of detection of M.H.T. are (i) the high 
risk and (ii) the mass approaches (G.P. or clinic). The high 
risk approach identifies those likely to be or to become M.H.T. 
e.g. middle aged males, with follow up care provided by family 
physicians. This approach remains largely developmental. The 
clinical a~proach in mass-screening for hypertension e.g. at 
major hospitals or shopping centres, has proved to be 
unsatisfactory on both cost effective and medical grounds 
WEINSTEIN and STASON [28,p738] conclude that intervention to 
improve patient adherence to therapy, should take precedence 
over mass screening programs. 
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The National Heart Foundation of Australia (N.H.F.)[43] 
has recently recommended a stepped care approach in controlling 
hypertension, for incorporation, in national public health 
policy. The recommendations include:-
(i) routine screening for symptomless hypertension; 
(ii) pharmacalogical treatment for all persons with 
B .P. in excess of 95 rom Hg.; 
(iii) development of effective economic procedures to 
reduce treatment costs; 
(iv) continued research into non-drug treatment, 
preventiop and control. 
The cost-benefit analysis undertaken assumes (i) and (ii), while 
addressing the objectives of (iii) and (iv) above. 
"The determination of prevention priorities by disease 
costing may offer the best chance of obtaining the 
resources required for prevention [in the context of tight 
budgetary constraint], because it facilitates cost-benefit 




Cost-benefit analysis applies the principles of welfare 
economics, in the allocation of scarce resources among competing 
ends, to specific interventions in the market place. The central 
concern is the maximization of social welfare, in that the 
" ••• activity results in a net increase in the value of goods and 
services produced throughout the economy" [ 1 ,pll]. 
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The value of these goods and services is determined by the 
level of demand or the willingness of individuals to pay for 
them (W.T.P.). In the absence of market failure we assume an 
optimal distribution of income and that consumers are the best 
judges of their own welfare. 
An allocation is said to be Pareto optimal, when no 
alternative allocation can make one individual better off 
without making some other worse off. The operational form of 
this criterion is potential Pareto optimality (Hicks-Kaldor 
compensation) where " ••• an increase in general welfare occurs if 
those that are made better off ••• could, in principle, fully 
compensate those that are made worse off and still achieve an 
inprovement in welfare" [l,pl3]. 
WHY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS? 
Essentially, C.B.A., as an efficiency technique, is useful 
for informing government policy in the appropriate form of 
intervention in the provision of the public good of health. 
Intervention is justified if the market can be said to be 
failing, in providing the optimal quantity of the good. Health 
care resources are allocated effeciently when no change in 
output mix, production technology or distribution increases 
total social welfare. The state is Pareto optimal. 
A practical definition of health is the absence of disease 
and the adverse side effects of treatment. A non-Pareto optimal 
state exists with welfare lower than that obtainable, where 
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given an alternative allocation of health funding, M.H.T. 
prevalence could be reduced with no lowering of welfare 
elsewhere. Hicks-Kaldor hyperthetical compensation by gainers or 
losers, provides the minimum pre-requisite. Though a stable 
equilibrium might exist, prices may not reflect social 
opportunity costs. 
The medical market is largely the result of an attempt to 
overcome the lack of optimality, due to the non marketability of 
the bearing of suitable risks and the imperfect marketability of 
information. Arrow [2] has reviewed the role of risk and 
uncertainty in the market, for health care. 
Due to lack of information with regard to risk factors in 
stroke and M.I. consumers are likely to have a distorted rate of 
time preference. Self interested individuals in the market dont 
adequately take externalities into account in the valuation of 
health output. No price is placed on the positive externalities 
generated by drug treatment e.g. increased productivity, or 
spillover of an individuals' health status into anothers utility 
function. 
"[In the insurance market ] the apparent welfare loss (due 
to expost consumption exceeding the quantity where MB=MC), 
must be compared with the gain derived from the reduced 
risk from unexpected health expenditure" 
[22,pl57] 
A comparison of the perfectly competitive model under 
uncertainty with the medical care market, reveals that 
conceivable insurance policies do not exist. Insurance against 
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death, total, incomplete or delayed recovery, and loss of 
productive activity from M.H.T. related events may be absent. 
The standard failure in life insurance is moral hazard. 
The event insured against is not independant of the taking of 
insurance. Provision for such cannot be written into the 
contract. The risk averse individual lives with M.H.T., with the 
guarantee of certain income m, in the event of death or 
disability. Premiums based upon predictable risks result in an 
underproduction of goods considered risk complementary. The 
risks cannot be spread as preferred. 
While the pursuit o'f an 'unhealthy' lifestyle, is not in 
the realm of strict life-insurance contracts, a social cost is 
inflicted on society to which no price is attached. The market 
fails in insuring human capital. Conversely consumers are not 
faced with the true cost of diet and lifestyle modifications 
e.g. the higher incidence of M.I. among middle-aged joggers. 
In the absence of externalities the risk averse consumer 
will insure himself against the costs of health care if offered 
an actuarially fair premium (price expected value). In the 
real market, premiums hear little relation to actuarial risk. 
The price of purchasing insurance is less than the opportunity 
cost, resulting in over-insurance e.g. premium splitting, tax 
offsets and group schemes. 
On the supply-side the insurance market fails to take 
account of psychic disutility and externality resulting from 
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M.H.T. related events. Under risk pooling, the insurers expected 
welfare loss is made infinitely small. However the pooling of 
unequal risks introduces failure. Certain ages and lifestyle 
patterns lend themselves to M.H.T. conditions. 
"Individuals ••• are willing to make exchanges between their 
own health [human capital] and other desirables ••• which 
tend to increase blood pressure" 
[4,p27] 
Maximum possible discrimination of risks in the insurance market 
is required for full social benefit. 
Limited entry with regard to the use of trained physicians 
verses imperfect substitutes e.g. para-medics, creates market 
failure. A physician's time may be employed in tasks utilizing 
only a small proportion of his human capital e.g. more efficient 
resource allocation might be achieved by nurses regularly taking 
blood-pressure. 
The patient, being relatively ignorant with regard to 
appropriate treatment and liklihood of success, must place his 
trust in the medical code of ethics. Doctors may be more 
concerned with exploiting their monopoly power, in maximising 
economic rent through, say, price discrimination. Marginal 
variations in care are not reflected in the scheduled fee. The 
collective monopoly characteristic may result in the rich 
compensating the poor. Consumers also lack knowledge of the 
services available e.g. that blood pressure will be taken upon 
request. 
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Thus, although health is a marketable commodity, not only 
may no equilibrium or a Pareto inefficient one be achieved, but 
movement towards such may be slow and inconsistent. 
Externalities, consumer irrationality and ignorance, uncertainty 
and capital market imperfections (moral hazard) can largely be 
held responsible. Irrationality can be illustrated with 
particular reference to adherance-to-therapy in M.H.T. control. 
Once patients begin to feel better they cease medication. 
Failure in physcian adherance occurs since G.P.'s dont routinely 
take blood pressure. 
Government intervention can be justified in an inefficient 
market where there is scope for potential Pareto improvement and 
the cost of intervention is less than the cost of market 
failure. The form of intervention must be decided upon be it 
tax, subsidy, price manipulation, creation of a public monopoly 
in insurance or specific health program. The costs of 
intervention are often hard to ascertain. Though C.B.A. provides 
a means. Non lump-sum taxes make assessment of improvement in 
efficiency of any market difficult. The theory of Second Best 
suggests that market failure may be optimal. 
Public goods theory indicates that government 
intervention, may make the market result worse. Government 
decisions are generally ill-informed due to political self 
interest and voters rational ignorance. A line of argument 
developed largely by TULLOCK [25] and BUCHANNAN [7]. The C.B.A. 
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helps inform government decision making, as to the true welfare 
effects of proposals for government provision of the.public 
good. 
It has been argued that strict application of C.B.A. using 
the potential Pareto improvement criterion, with individuals 
valuations of welfare, may be too limited (see SUGDEN and 
WILLIAMS [23,pl78]). The government should intervene in the 
market, since individuals are not always the best judges of 
their own welfare. It is held that merit good arguments have no 
legitimate place in C.B.A. People are often rational in 
accepting the risk of M.H.T. and related events, given adequate 
wage compensation. Alternatively they prefer the risks of M.H.T. 
rather than forgo utility in undertaking life-long drug therapy. 
C.B .A. can help provide well informed government intervention 
only when market failures prevent rational valuation of welfare 
by individuals. 
Though the literature and practical analysis C.B.A., to 
resource allocation for disease is volumous, " ••• other areas 
seem under-represented in the literature ••• drugs ••• and the non 
medical means of dealing with health problems" [8,p22]. Further 
GRIFFITHS [14,pl20] observes that "The surprising thing, given 
the prevalence of ••• mild hypertension, is that so little 
practical economic analysis has been done so far". This 
analysis, attempts to go some way towards bridging this gap, in 
practical application. The detection and control of mild 
9 
hypertension, through alternative treatment mixes is examined. 
Special emphasis is given to non-drug treatments as an 
alternative to life-long pharmacological courses of therapy. 
While the analysis is performed in a national context, the 
results are applicable on a statewide basis. The C.B.A. is 
designed to indicate (i) whether of not detection and treatment 
of the M.H.T. stock and flow (those becoming M.H.T. per unit 
time), is economically justifiable, (ii) if so which treatment 
mixes produce the highest social benefits (iii) who should be 
treated, according to age and sex. 
NOTES: 
1 Even in the absence of other risk factors e.g. high 
cholesterol levels, and obesity '~igh blood pressure 




TilE PRINCIPLES AND IMPlEMENTATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
C.B.A. helps determine whether the real resource or social 
opportunity costs outweigh the social benefits of some project. 
As argued above, the non-marketability of health means that the 
efficient level of output is unlikely to be achieved. In the 
market for healthcare, KLARMAN [17] argues that C.B.A. performs 
in the public sector what demand and supply fail to do in the 
private. 
A benefit may be, broadly defined as the utility, or 
satisfaction that some course of action brings. Since cost 
includes opportunity cost, costs can be viewed as benefits 
foregone, or negative benefits. A C.B.A. requires the 
identification, quantification and valuation of all costs and 
benefits. The further costs and benefits lie in the future, the 
smaller is their present value, due to the concept of time 
preference and the possibility of productive investment. The 
discount rate is chosen to make future dollars commensurate with 
current dollars. 
The standard taxonomy divides benefits into (i) visibles, 
and (ii) invisibles, both direc~ and indirect 1 • Direct visible 
benefits are closely related to the aim of the project, of those 
persons becoming normotensive after treatment. They are visible 
11 
in being marketable. These include saved future medical 
expenses, the value of resources that would otherwise have been 
used in the rehabilitation after stroke and heart attack and 
absence from productive activity avoided. Indirect invisible 
benefits include increased life-expectancy, through decreased 
incidence of mortality. Indirect visible benefits accrue to 
those at whom the program is not directed e.g. insurance 
companies and other third parties for whom M.H.T. represents an 
externality, or savings in resources for retraining of 
personnel to replace the dead and disabled (human capital). 
Finally, indirect invisible benefits relate to pyschic benefits 
of people for whom utility is a function of others well being. 
Additionally private resources are freed, otherwise used to 
reduce job stress e.g. psychoanalysis, social welfare programs. 
While visible costs/benefits are easily quantified 
" ••• there is no case for arbitrarily excluding intangibles 
however difficult they are to evaluate". [p 173]. 
MEASUREMENT 
The valuation of social benefits implicitly uses the 
concept of Marshallian consumer surplus [18] the maximum sum of 
money a consumer would be willing to pay for a given amount of a 
good, less the amount he actually pays. MISHAN [19] has 
introduced compensating variation (C.V.) as a practical measure 
of the surplus. Where the individual is made better (worse) off 
it is the maximum (minimum) he is willing to pay (accept) to 
12 
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undergo the program. The initial level of satisfaction is 
maintained. The program is said to yield a potential Pareto 
n 
improvement where, i~1 cvi > 0, people gain more from the program 
than some 1 ose. 
THE VAllE OF LIFE 
Savings in morbidity and mortality are the major benefits 
of effective control of M.H.T. Two major means of valuation have 
been proposed. 
The gross output or human capital approach attributes 
health benefits to change~ in economic productivity, measured as 
the net present value of expected future life-time earnings. 
Aggregate work years lost due to mortality, morbidity and 
disability are calculated in the absence of the program. The 
wage rate, which is the productivity measure, is imputed in the 
absence of a market e.g. housecleaner rates for housewives. 
A variant on human capital is the net-output approach. It 
is measured as the value of the wage earner's output net of his 
own consumption. This expost setting leads to theoretical 
difficulty. The approach is unsound, since own consumption 
provides the wage-earner with satisfaction. As a member of 
society, this utility should be used in aggregating social 
welfare. Where we are maximising economic growth, with re-
investable surplus, subsistence or essential costs of living 
could be deducted from gross output. 
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The willingness-to-pay' (W.T.P.) valuation tequnique, has 
been proposed by MISHAN [ 9]. It is based upon individuals own 
valuations of decreases in risks. The change in welfare is 
measured by the "willingness to pay" (market revealed), for the 
benefits of the project. 
The relevant sums to subtract from benefits are those 
compensating people for additional risk to the whole of society 
(C.V's). Additional risks, voluntarily assumed, are ignored 
since they are already capitalized into the market. Compensating 
variation is used as the certainty equivalent. Universal risk 
aversion is assumed. 
The equivalent variation (E.V.) is an alternative measure 
of consumer surplus. It measures that amount of money forfeited 
to avoid an undesirable change (the premium) or required in 
2 
compensation to forego a desirable change • The subsequent level 
of satisfaction is maintained. Where income effects are small, 
the choice between using EV or CV is ambiguous. Health, however, 
is considered to be a normal good involving a particularly 
strong income effect. This is illustrated by the obervation 
health expenditure by low income earners is small. E.V.'s, in 
generally exceeding C.V. 's, will represent an overstatement of 
willingness to pay. 
As JONES-LEE [16] has argued, for a program saving n 
statistical lives, in period t, for each member in society the 
change in safety represents the marginal change in individual 
risk. A health program yields small changes in life expectancy. 
The appropriate unit for assessing program desirability is the 
marginal value of an increase in life expectancy. For these 
purposes, with small income effects, CU's and EV's are identical 
measures. 
W.T.P. could be determined directly by survey 
(questionnaire). Alternatively, through revealed preference by 
examination of wage differentials (premiums) in high risk 
occupations e.g. for North Sea oil divers. Consumption, through 
housing and travel choices, is indicative of the perceived risk 
of death or injury in a particular activity [4,p30]. 
Criticism has been leveled at both the human capital and 
'willingness' to pay methods, as appropriate benefit valuation 
techniques. 
MISHAN argues that human capital is based on maximising 
G.N.P., which is not an acceptable goal of economic policy. The 
approach, he asserts is not grounded in economic theory since 
the potential Pareto improvement criterion becomes irrelevant. 
The approach measures the market value of livelihood rather than 
the value of life. Life has value beyond that of lost 
productivity. The method is biased for males over females, 
workers over pensioners, and the high over the low income. 
Mishan's criticisms appear to be overstated. Though W.T.P. 
may be superior theoretically, 
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notably 
" ••• there is no satisfactory means to date of generating 
consistent and useful numbers for [W.T.P.] valuation 
of life ••• " [26,p89]. 
The human capital approach does provide the only systematic 
means of valuation. Human capital is not directed at indicating 
the value of life, rather it measures the cost of the disease. 
Validity in the measurement of these costs, doesn't require 
G.N.P., maximization as a criterion. The approach is grounded in 
the theory of marginal productivity, with the assumptions of 
earnings reflecting prod-uctivity, a competitive labour market 
and profit maximization. Admittedly, market imperfections i.e. 
union activity, or lack of competition, might prevent earnings 
from accurately reflecting the value of output. 
Risk myopia results in misinformed consumer choice, in 
preference revelation for W.T.P. Appropiateness of response in 
asking individuals to value small changes in risks is a function 
of questionnaire design. Neither human capital nor W.T.P. 
consider the elderly. Revealed preference in high risk 
occupations is distorted by less risk aversion among some 
workers than others. Social insurance, provided under the 
governments merit considerations, further distorts the correct 
revelation of preferences. 
Both methods can be drawn together, despite the 
dichotomies. W.T.P. measures an individuals willingness to 
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sacrifice wealth, for future consumption to obtain improved 
chances of survival. It is the sum of consumer surpluses from 
all future consumption (life-time utility) in addition to net 
human capital. Thus, even with the government insurance 
distortion, the individual is rational in taking out extra 
insurance, which he bases on discounted expected future life-
3 
time earnings • He insures to avoid an anticipated loss in net 
output, or human capital. W.T.P. is also implicit in an earnings 
measure for mild hypertension control. Higher wages can be 
viewed as compensation for increased stress and hence liklihood 
of developing M.H.T. 4 
Finally, an attack levelled by BROOME [5], at W.T.P. 
underlines the need for an ex ante benefit valuation. If 
identification of persons who will lose their lives if a program 
does (not) proceed is possible, infinitely high compensation 
would be demanded. This ex post result is inconsistent with 
health program evaluation. The marginal change in individual 
risk, ex ante, is the only relevant consideration. 
Decision-maker's valuations of life are also informative 
e.g. court decisions on compensation, or implicit valuation in 
the political process, through examination of past government 
investment expenditures effecting life and limb. Project 
appraisal by decision-makers, does not make explicit reference 
to individu~s valuations, therefore potential Pareto improvement 
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is no longer relevant. While no satisfactory Social Welfare 
Function is said to exist decisions made at the administrative 
level are still likely to approach society's 'opti optimorum'. 
Thus administrative valuation should provide an approximation of 
the value placed on life, by individuals, in the aggregate. 
Court awards made for injury and death, however, though a 
function of expected losses in productivity and emotional cost, 
are subject to judicial whimsy. 
The life insurance approach employs examination of y/p, 
with y=premium and p=the additional risk, as the value placed on 
life. As a variant of w.r.P. it is subject to the weaknesses 
outlined above. Intuitively, this approach fails since life 
insurance is a measure of the insureree's value to others, not 
himself. Health status indexes are a more recent attempt at life 
valuation. These indexes are largely confined to cost-effective 
analysis, with increased years of life adjusted for quality. 
A common approach is to ascribe values between 0 (death) and 1 
(perfect health), to different health states (outputs). Indexes 
suffer from problems of reliability, validity and definitional 
consistency. 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND 1RE PENS lONER PROBLEM 
The human capital approach to valuation of life is age 
dependent i.e. a life lost at an early age is worth more than 
one lost later. A pragmatic interpretation of human capital 
means that health policy should not be directed at savings in 
, 
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mortality and morbidity for pensioners, the severely disabled 
and retarded, whose future earnings are limited. However the 
social value of a prevented death or existence value of these 
persons, is evidenced by the extent of social security 
provision, and individual's charitable propensities. 
Transfer payments are excluded from C.B.A. They include 
all payments not made in return for some productive service. The 
transfers dont arise from the production of new goods and 
services, and hence do not contribute to, but distribute G.N.P. 
(from earners to non earners). e.g. Unemployment benefits to not 
enter C.B.A. as the opp,ortunity cost of employment in some 
industry. Pensions present a difficult problem for valuation in 
this respect. 
FRIEDMAN [12] has developed a life-cycle, permanent income 
theory of consumption. People maintain a smooth profile of 
income/consumption throughout their lives. Current consumption 
is set as some fraction of long run estimates, in wealth or 
permanent income terms. The estimate, made by an individual, of 
his permanent income uses his current income and all incomes 
from earlier periods. Larger weights are attached to the more 
recent incomes. Consumption is depressed in middle age, 
presumably with a view to smoothing the receipt of income into 
retirement. 
Pensions are transfer payments, though they can be viewed 
as payment for productive activity earlier in life. They do not 
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result from the production of new goods and services. It is held 
that pensioners can legitimately be included in valuation of 
life in human capital terms. We must assume,contrary to MISHAN, 
that maximization of G.N.P. does not provide the basis for gross 
output valuation. Under optimal distribution of purchasing 
power, use of a permanent income model, allows explicit 
valuation of life for those not currently earning wages. Thus in 
this analysis pensions as transfers are not used in valuation. 
Current average weekly earnings are used on life-cycle grounds. 
Valuation problems aside, the implementation of the M.H.T. 
program, can be viewed as,a purchase of survival, decreasing the 
probabilities of the loss of life. The pensioner is guaranteed a 
fixed income stream by society. The level of payment is not 
adjusted for changes in survival probability. Thus the pensioner 
is unlikely to take account of the effect of his survival 
expenditure on the feasible quantities of resources used in 
providing the program. Over utilization of the medical services 
results. Pensioners are rewarded by receiving the average, 
rather than marginal product necessary for program efficiency. 
The problem is analagous to that pertaining to the open access 
fishery [57,pl04]. For optimality pensioners would need to be 
charged the price that their increased expenditures cost 
society. 
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CHOICE OF THE DISCOUNT RATE IN PUBLIC PROJECT APPRAISAL 
The discount rate (D.R.) provides a means of comparing 
dollar costs and benefits occurring through time, in a 
meaningful manner. Society attaches weights to this stream of 
benefits. A single D.R. is considered, assuming these weights 
decrease smoothly and exponentially. The desirability of a 
program, is particularly sensitive to its choice. The higher the 
D.R. the less favourable projects appear, whose benefits occur 
for off e.g. health programs for M.H.T. control, whose benefit, 
in reduced mortality occur for off 35 year olds, while costs of 
(drug) treatment are immediate. 
are:-
The three main positions held with respect to D.R. choice 
(i) D.R. should reflect the social rate of time 
preference (S.R.T.P.), society's trade off between 
present and future benefits; 
(ii) the value should reflect the opportunity cost of 
using resources in the public sector with the rate 
of return foregone in the private sector; 
(iii) D.R. as a weighted average of the rates of return in 
the private sector in proportion to the funds drawn 
from each source; 
The social rate of time preference is uncertain and 
unobservable. In perfectly competitive equilibrium all borrowing 
and lending occurs on the same terms. Therefore all marginal 
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rates of time preference are identical, yielding the market 
interest rate, as the appropriate D.R. Capital markets, however, 
are imperfect. Several market interest rates prevail, reflecting 
different degrees of risk and time preference. Additionally, 
market rates of interest would equal private preference only 
under the assumption of perfect information. These distortions, 
combined with interest rates on bonds, being a function of 
government pol icy, make market interest rates an inappropriate 
measure of social time preference. 
The divergence between S.R.T.P. and personal time 
preference, is reinforc~d by the likelihood of a suboptimal 
level of savings. People fail to maximise their welfare in 
evaluation of present versus future consumption. PIGOU'S 
"defective telescopic" faculty [20,p25], accounts for this 
phenomenon. Individuals spending/saving decisions in the current 
period are based upon expected future life time earnings and a 
faulty conception of the economy's transformation set. Scarcity 
in resources is not considered. Future benefits are heavily 
discounted, yielding higher levels of consumption and lower 
levels of investment, than required for optimality. People's 
short-sightedness results in a D.R. likely to overstate the 
6 
social rate of time preference • Since people prefer health 
benefits sooner rather than later [13], the first drug doses 
taken for M.H.T. control are likely to be valued more highly, 
than those taken later in life (under life long therapy). This 
must be considered an important element in lack of adherance to 
therapy. 
Market interest rates, do not equate, private and social 
rates of time preference. People appear to have more concern for 
the future relative to the present however, than the market 
suggests. The welfare of future generations may enter the 
utility functions of the living, as reflected in externality 
effects of the savings decision. This concern for the standard 
of living of the unborn is not reflected in the level of 
interest rates. The government, at least, is "trustee" [ 11 ,p365] 
of future generations with regard to intertemporal resource 
distribution. Again we conclude that the market rate is likely 
to exceed the S.R.T.P. This perspective is subject to objections 
raised by TULLOCK [24]. Since aggregate social welfare is rising 
through time e.g. through technical progress in man-made capital 
the intensity of "inter-generational concern" is likely to be 
slight. Investments made in exhaustible resources, however, 
remain relevant. 
BAUMOL [3] has suggested that the adoption of the yield on 
risk-free long term government bonds, would provide an upper 
bound on S.R.T.P. People buying bonds must prefer this 
investment to present consumption. If S.R.T.P. exceeded the 
interest rate on bonds, they wouldn't invest. The government 
would use its tax/transfer power to change the level of 
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aggregate savings, if on S.R.T.P. grounds, it believed the level 
of saving to be too low. 
The potential Pareto improvement criterion, while also 
suggestive of a solution, depends upon the time period of the 
hyperthetical transfers, producing an ambiguous result. The D.R. 
for public project-s is a social opportunity cost. It should 
represent the rate of return on society's next best use of its 
resources. 
"Consistency requires that projects with the same time 
stream of social costs and benefits should be treated in 
the same way, whether they are proposed in the public or 
private sectors" 
SUGDEN AND WILLIAMS [23p212] 
The social D.R. it is argued, should reflect the 
opportunity cost of private sector capital subject to adjustment 
for the social cost of diseconomies e.g. pollution. Public 
sector for resources are obtained from the private sector mainly 
through taxation. The rate of return should reflect that which 
the private sector loses through taxation. 
Examined in isolation the opportunity cost of capital 
depends upon whether funds raised for public investment are at 
the expense of private consumption or investment (or some 
combination of the two). Raised at the expense of private 
consumption alone, the D.R. should reflect the private rate of 
time preference. The D.R. would be lower than that used by the 
private sector if the opportunity cost were solely displacing 
private investment given partial reinvestment of returns. 
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Alternatively, the D.R. would lie between the rate of time 
preference and the private rate, given displacement of both 
7 investment and consumption. Under less than full employment , 
public expenditure is not entirely at the private sector's 
expense. Resource expansion, with the multiplier effect, results 
in an investible surplus and hence a lower D.R. 
Social welfare increases when public projects are 
undertaken which yield higher rates of return than the private. 
However a social D.R. set bel ow the private internal rate of 
return (IRR) results in suboptimal resource allocation. 
HIRSCHLEIFER [58] and MISHAN recommend that we ignore time 
preference and set the D.R. equal to the private IRR. Though it 
remains likely that the social rate of disc aunt is 1 ower than 
the private rate. 
The extent of the divergence between the private and 
social opportunity costs is difficult to determine. Taxation on 
private profit is the major cause of the indeterminacy. Private 
projects, discounted at 4%, incurr an implicit social rate of 
discount of 8%, with a 50% tax on profits. Thus while pre-tax 
returns might approximate the social rate of discount, after tax 
returns will exceed social rate of discount. The incentive to 
save and invest is reduced. We ignore policy directed at 
achieving the optimal level of investment through tax/subsidy 
schemes. 
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Uncertainty remains as the major difficulty in using the 
opportunity cost of capital as a reflection of the D.R. In 
private firms shareholders view the possibility of a gain as 
worth less than its expected value (the certainty equivalent). 
Exante under risk aversion, a real cost is borne in bearing 
risk. 
Three main views thave been expressed in coping with 
uncertainty:-
(i) as elucidated earlier, time and risk preference 
should be left to decision maker's valuations. The 
market is too imperfect to reveal private risk 
preferences; 
(ii) discounting for time and risk, in private and public 
projects, should be on the same basis. Public 
projects will, thus, not displace private investment 
passing at higher rates of return HIRSCHLEIFER [58]; 
and 
(iii) the approach generally adopted as put forth by 
BAUMOL and, ARROW and LIND [2]. Public projects can 
be considered 'less risky' than corresponding 
private projects, since the tax system may be used 
to pool the risk among N taxpayers. The costs of 
failure are small, relative to average per capita 
income. The government acts as an expected value 
decision maker. Contrary to HIRSCHLEIFER, we 
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effectively ignore uncertainty behaving as if we are 
indifferent to risk. The D.R. comes to reflect 
private investments made under certain returns 
BAUMOlS risk free bond rate, again becomes an 
attractive proxy. 
SANDMO and DREZE [59] have suggested another alternative in 
social D.R. determination. This consists of a weighted average 
of the rates of return in the private sector, in proportion to 
the funds drawn from each private source. This approach is 
inappropriate, since it attempts to draw together two distinct 
concepts of S .R.T .P. and ,Opportunity cost of private investment, 
into a single price. 
The rate of interest on long term bonds remains the only 
reasonable approximation for the social rate of time preference. 
This rate may still lie above the true S.R.T.P., due to market 
'myopia". Programs involving 1 ong term benefits are favoured by 
a S.R.T.P., rather than the higher opportunity cost D.R. 
UNEMPLOYMENT, INFlATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
In general inflation does not provide a source of 
technical difficulty in discounting and in choice of the D.R. 
All costs and benefits are expressed in constant prices and a 
real rate of discount is used. Changes in the relative prices 
introduce added complexity. The prices of the goods in question 
must be adjusted relative to the expected changes in their 
value, relative to the general level of prices. We assume that 
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the relative prices of medical services, labour and drugs remain 
constant over the life of the program. 
"Full crowding out" implies that government public 
spending is made entirely at the expense of private investment 
expenditure. However, at less than full employment this is no 
longer a truism. The additional employment generated by a 
public project is a benefit. Additionally the opportunity cost 
of labour is relatively low, and no longer adequately reflected 
by the wage rate A C.B.A., by failing to take into account 
multiplier effects on aggregate income of additional employment, 
will underestimate benefits and overstate its social costs. 
Costs are not corrected for projected unemployment 
effects, largely on the practical grounds suggested in PREST and 
TURVEY [21] i.e. difficulties in projecting future unemployment 
levels, and the dependence of employment levels upon expenditure 
as well as the method of project financing. 
Increases in productivity, are reflected in a growth in 
real wages. The D.R. must be adjusted upwards for the projected 
rate of growth. Changes in relative productivity, between 
sectors, are an additional consideration. 
The D.R. recommended for Commonwealth government projects 
is 10%. DOESSEL [10] also regards the "right" rate as being of 
this order. He supports his choice with reference to the very 
tangible loss incurred when D.R. for public projects is below 
the rate of return on private sector investment. From a 
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practical standpoint, with a fixed supply of funds, very low 
D.R. 's mean that more projects pass than can be funded and the 
ranking of these will be altered. A problem of second-best 
results. The 10% D.R. will ensure the undertaking of the 
cheapest projects first, since the order of implementation would 
be likely to change at lower rates i.e. highly capital intensive 
projects with low future running costs are favoured by a low 
D.R. 
The risk fee bond rate, as a proxy for the social rate of 
time preference, is the most popular choice. Adjustment for 
expectations of inflation, might leave it in the order of 4-5%. 
The bond rate reflects the aggregate willingness of consumers to 
surrender their savings. Since social time preference, is likely 
to understate individual time preference, it favours programs 
with long term benefits e.g. M.H.T. control (as opposed to the 
higher D.R. reflected in opportunity cost). 
ANDERSON and SETTLE [1] remark that the social rate of 
time preference, is generally believed to lie somewhere between 
2.5% and 6%. As WARNER and LUCE [26,p97] suggest 
" ••• the best strategy seems to be to seek a reasonable 
number (for example, 3 percent) and then test the 
sensitivity of findings to both higher and lower rates." 
4percent was chosen as the preferred rate of discount. This is 
consistent with an estimate of the real D.R. from the inflation 
free period of the 1950's, valued at 4-6 percent [60]. The 
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effect of changes in productivity can be gauged from the 
sensitivity performed at 2,3,6 and 10 percent. 
The use of a real rate of discount as low as 4% can be 
justified in the special context of the health benefits 
accrueing in M.H.T. treatment. Assume a single person two good, 
two period economy. The individual is likely to discount the 
future too heavily due to 
(i) time preference. Persons undergoing life-long drug 
therapy, or diet modification, while investing in 
their human capital through treatment, value 
immediate health benefits more highly than those far 
off. (manifested in the early dropout component of 
non-adherers to therapy). 
or (ii) opportunity cost, the price of alterations in 
lifestyle especially for the young, to life long 
therapy are to high. Benefits in reduced morbidity 
and mortality occur too far off and are heavily 
discounted. The marginal rates of substitution 
between present and future consumption of benefits 
are too low. 
EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
C.B.A.'s in health care rarely deal with the issue of 
equity. The use of the age and sex-specific wage rates, in the 
human capital approach values mortality and morbidity savings in 
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w~king males more than females. The benefits of M.H.T. 
treatment accrue most heavily to the elderly. 
On allocational grounds alone, a program for screening and 
detection of M.H.T. could be justified, even with a low rate of 
return, if it reached the poor and uneducated, whom the private 
sector might otherwise neglect (a market failure argument for 
government intervention). C.B.A., however, stems from the 
potential Pareto improvement criterion where all individuals can 
only conceivably be made better off by the intervention. Thus 
considerations of equity in C.B.A. calculation might result in a 
departure from the Pareto criterion and its replacement by 
attempts at maximization of total utility (Pareto optimality). 
Projects could pass even though their social cost exceeded their 
social benefit. Everyone could be made worse off. 
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NOTES 
1 The same distinctions apply to costs 
2 The same change in utility as would be achieved by the 
proposed change. 
[ 3] Also the basis of compensation in court awards, with 
quality of life adjustment. 
[ 4] We assume, individuals act under an "executive stress" 
assumption "while epidemiological studies do not support 
this view" [38, p 16] 
[ 5] Mustacchi [42,AB] finds that hypertension is considered 
work related and 'therefore compensable " ••• judicial 
precedent has accepted the umproven theory that 
••• hypertension ••• [is due to] the stresses of work". 
[ 6 ] The public good problem manifests itself in non 
excludability from a particular individuals act of 
saving. 
[ 7 ] Though, with output as a parameter of macro-policy, 'full-




THE COSTS OF MILD HYPERTENSION (M.H.T .. ) 
The costs of the M.H.T. condition are divided into 
mortality i.e. fatal events of stroke and myocardial infarction 
(M.I.), and morbidity or non-fatal events. Elevated blood 
pressure increases the probability of death and disability by 
increasing the incidence rate of events. 
MORTALITY 
The technique employed was based upon the expected future 
life time earnings criterion. Life tables were used in obtaining 
P(Dt+l/t), the probability of dying between age t last birthday 
and age t+l last birthday [54]. Effectively this may be treated 
as the normal life expectancy of persons who have been treated 
successfully for M.H.T. It should be noted that M.H.T. is 
epidemic in Australia. M.H.T. fatal events might then be a 
significant factor in the calculation of life-tables. The danger 
of double-counting results. This phenomenon was not considered 
to have significantly effected the conclusions. 
A review of the relevant literature failed to yield 
exhaustive and compatible data indicating the increased 
probability of death due to M.H.T. An approximation was made 
given that M.H.T. accounts for almost 60% of all M.I.'s and 
1 
strokes (fatal and nonfatal) - see Appendix C. The resulting 
conditional probabilities were extrapolated using the median 
age, of the particular age catagories. 
The target population, calculated at 662,800 was 
disaggregated by 5-year age groups and sex (see APPENDIX A(i)). 
Ages 35 through 69 were chosen, given that medical research 
indicates no demonstrable benefits for those falling outside 
this range. 
Contrary to the accepted line of criticism, directed at 
the productivity approach to valueing life, pensioners are 
valued at the current market wage. This approach is supported by 
the permanent income pypothesis presented earlier. Since 
government redistributive policy is linked to current wages, use 
of earlier wage rates is difficult. Current average weekly 
earnings data 1982 [51] provide an approximation for permanent 
income. 
Women also are valued at the current market wage. A change 
in the composition of the labour force, through women 
undertaking more responsible jobs, would be reflected in a rise 
in A.W.E. The premise is that more responsible jobs are more 
stressful. Consequent increases in the likelihood of M.I. and 
stroke require adequate wage compensation. Market failure may 
result in a distortion of market signals between wage 
differentals and stress however. 
The opportunity cost of being a housewife is not valued at 
being a paid housekeeper (an equivalent risk job). Thus the 
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-danger of double counting is introduced since housewives 
entering high risk jobs would lose their low risk status. Again 
the double counting effect can be considered negligible. It is 
assumed that work opportunities available generally consist of 
low stress occupations, as evidenced by the lower incidence of 
M.H.T. among women. 
MORTALITY MODEL 
X 
(see table following) 
number of persons with mild hypertension (stock), at 
'th 
the beginning of their t year. 
monthly earnings. 
* 'th P(Dt+l/t) : conditional probability on t birthday of death 
before age t+l, given mildly hypertensive. 
: present value of an annuity of $1 over 6 periods 
(months) at 1! 3% per period. 
representative individual's net present value of 
annual expected losses, for age group t. 
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.00176 .00088 .00152 .00080 12.728 2.78 
.00199 .00102 .00163 .00090 12.728 2.78 
.00226 .00117 .00177 .00100 12.728 2.78 
.00255 .00134 .00193 .00112 12.728 2.78 
.00287 .00151 .00213 .00125 15.00 
.00323 .00170 .00236 .00139 15.00 




.00408 .00211 .00297 .00171 15.00 3.47 
.00457 .00236 .00333 .00191 15.00 3.47 
45 1646 1292 .00509 .00263 .00373 .00213 13.466 5.45 











.00626 .00327 .00465 .00267 13.466 5.45 
.00689 .00362 .00516 .00298 13.466 5.45 
.00760 .00398 .00574 .00329 13.466 5.45 
.00836 .00435 .00638 .00361 16.092 6.97 
.00922 .00471 .00711 .00393 16.092 6.97 
.01001 .00509 .00790 .00426 16.092 6.97 
.01112 .00549 .00877 .00461 16.092 6.97 
































-84 18 15.72 
93 20 16.89 
0.62 405.92 119.91 5,166,550 
0.93 419.62 124.06 5,340,923 
1.32 432.61 128.06 5,506,260 
1.71 444.76 131.81 5,660,905 
2.02 456.02 135.30 6,840,300 
2.41 466.46 138.61 6,996,900 
2.80 475.95 141.65 7,l39,25Q 
3.11 484.56 144.41 7,268,400 
3.50 492.25 146.95 7,383,750 
3.83 498.88 149.19 6,717,918 
4.21 505.02 151.17 6,800,599 
4.60 510.09 152.84 6,868,872 
















135 30 19.33 
148 33 20.60 
161 35 20.59 
179 38 22.94 
5.67 518.95 155.95 8,350,943 1,086,972 
5.98 519.60 156.29 8,361,403 1,089,341 
6.36 518.96 156.32 8,351,104 1,089,550 
6.74 518.31 155.96 8,340,645 1,087,041 
196 41 24.11 7.00 515.18 155.19 8,290,277 1,081,674 





.01474 .00712 .01179 .00599 14.564 7.388 
.01626 .00788 .01297 .00659 14.564 7.388 
.01793 .00870 .01429 .00726 14.564 7.388 
.01975 .00958 .01576 .00798 14.564 7.388 
" " 
215 53 28.48 8.51 505.04 152.69 7,355,403 1,128,074 
237 58 31.76 9.72 495.62 149.94 7,218,210 1,107,757 
261 64 35.14 10.85 482.41 145.82 7,025,819 1,077,318 
288 71 38.52 12.05 465.17 140.37 6,774,736 1,037,045 
60 1525 1096 .2174 .01051 .01740 .00875 12.188 6.684 9044 6500 265 70 39.25 11.44 443.71 133.46 5,407,938 
77 42.33 12.48 420.64 126.90 5,126,760 
84 45.49 13.52 393.44 118.99 4,795,247 






61 It .. .02389 .01149 .01921 .00957 12,188 6.684 " " 291 
62 II n ,02623 ,01253 ,02120 ,01045 12.188 6.684 n II 319 
63 II II ,02872 ,01365 .02334 .01141 12.188 6.684 n 10 350 







.03416 .01621 .02809 .01366 10.17 
.03717 .01768 .03075 .01497 10.17 
.04043 .01930 .03366 .01643 10.17 
.04399 .02107 .03688 .01805 10.17 






347 91 54.90 16.58 284.88 
378 99 58.06 17,62 239.17 
411 109 61.23 18.66 188.36 
447 118 64.30 19.63 132.21 












* Extrapolation on Nt between years, was not feasible given 
the double peaked, non-linear nature, of M.H. T. prevalence data. 
We assume, on average, death from M.H.T. events occurs on 
the 30 JUNE each year. These deaths cause losses in income for 
1st July to 31st December annually. Net loss occurring without 
therapy was calculated using 
* The product of Nt and present value of life-time losses yield 
the final mortality savings possible under fully effective 
treatment of the stock. 
STOCK-FlOW CONSIDERATIONS 
Other studies in hypertension control, both economic and 
medical, largely fail to consider the implications for costs of 
ongoing treatment, for those becoming hypertensive, the flow. 
An adequate treatment of the problem, presented by the flow, 
would require a purpose-built demographic model. The analysis 
presented, represents only a crude first approximation. 
A constant stock assumption allows the flow, those 
becoming M.H.T. annually, to be viewed as incurring some fixed 
proportion of the costs and benefits of the stock, in 
perpetuity, (given a constant state of technology with 'tastes' 
in lifestyle and diet constant). 
3t 








1 t t t t 
35 69 35 45 55 
Age(y) 6569 Age (y) 
Assuming zero population growth, the outflow (f) i.e. 
people dying from 'all causes' death and those turning 70 equals 
the inflow i.e. persons turning 35 years and people of any age 
acquiring, during the course of any year, a sustained elevation 
in blood pressure. 
Using the former (outflow) as a measure of the flow, 10170 
males and 5622 [52] females currently at age 69, leave the stock 
* * each year on turning 70. ct:.M and CX:.F indicate the absolute 
frequency of hypertensives dying annually, within age groups, 
where 
* OC.· M,F 
Assuming that the number of persons entering a particular 
M.H.T. age group is proportional to those dying annually (in 
perpetuity). 
F (LOW) * + cc * N69 M F t , 
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(see APPENDIX A (ii)) 
MORBIDITY 
The Australian National Blood Pressure trial concludes 
that effective treatment of one million H.T.'s in Australia 
would result in 7000 fewer cardiovascular events (M.I.) and 2000 
fewer strokes annually, at least [29] after a four-year period. 
The costs of morbidity were divided into: 
(i) hospitalization, the first year's treatment; 
(ii) future treatment; 
(iii)loss in labour productivity; 
(i) Again events are assumed to occur 30 June 
each year. The direct resource cost of hospitalization was 
estimated using average-length of stay data [47], for stroke and 
M.I. in Tasmania, and cost per bed day $246.27. This figure 
includes salary, wages, drug and medical treatment components 
[56]. Adjustment for inflation to June 1984 prices was performed 
using C.P.I. 'all groups' index [55]. 
HOSPITALIZATION COSTS 
UNDISCOUNTED 
(JUNE 1984 $) 
EVENT STROKE MI 
SEX M F M F 
AV. LENGTH 
STAY(DAYS) 33 47 11 18 
DIRECT COST ($) 8127 11575 2709 4433 
Using data on event incidence rates for stroke and M.I. 2 , 
ace ordi ng to age and sex (Appendix C), the discounted costs of 
hospitalization were calculated, at our preferred rate of 
discount 4%. 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS 
(STOCK) HOSPITALIZATION ($1984) D.R. 4% 
AGE M F 
35-39 1,801,847 6,660,088 
40-44 23,367,605 9,231,771 
45-49 47,947,554 14,244,168 
50-54 155,719,963 41,006,724 
55-59 173,856,274 46,770,840 
60-64 86,620,748 27,558,699 
65-69 24,244,406 7,751,311 
513,558,397 147,403,601 
660,961,998 
Although, non fatal events themselves decrease life 
expectancy, we assume expected losses in mortality have already 
taken this into account. Double counting is avoided. 
(ii) Future treatment costs present problems 
in estimation. Drug treatment, in rehabilitation for stroke and 
M.I. varies widely in duration, intensity and type. Treatment is 
a function of the severity and characteristics of the event. 
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HARTUNIAN, SMART and THOMPSON's analysis [15] provides a proxy 
for estimation. 
Discounting at HARTUNIAN'S preferred rate of 6% ($1975), 
the ratio of first year treatment to future treatment costs for 
both MI and stroke was found to be 2:1. The cost of treatment in 
the first year consisting primarily of that involved in treating 
the initial episode of the condition (hospitalization). While 
first year treatment costs would be relatively insensitive to 
use of different discount rates, future treatment costs might 
not be. Using Hartunian's average life expectancy with the 
events of stroke 10.5 years and MI,9 years and their U.S. 
figures, a sensitivity on future treatment costs was performed 
for D.R.'s of 2,3,4,6 and 10% (Appendix D). The 2:1 ratio 
remained robust. 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS ($1984) 
(STOCK) FUTURE TREATMENT D.R. 4% 
M 




(iii) 3 months absence from productive activity is 
assumed, per event, following Weisbrod [27]. This loss of 
earnings is in addition to that incurred during hospitalization 
[Appendix E]. Stock discounted costs are recorded below. 
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TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS ($1984) 
(STOCK) LOST PRODUCTIVITY D.R. 4% 
M F 
721 ,641, 978 121,354 
842,996,252 
(Appendix B (ii)) 
Flow morbidity costs were calculated in a similar manner. 
Total annual costs occurring in perpetuity in the absence of 
effective treatment according to:-
* 
* nt [ (----;- .C)/r]/DR 
Nt 
nt age group annual flow 
* Nt total H.T's by age groups. 
C annual cost in hospitalization, future treatment or 
lossed productivety (stock). 
r implicit, 6 months adjustment D.R. January of the 
year. 
DR discount rate 
TOTAL (FLOW) DISCOUNTED COSTS DR 4% 
HOSPITALIZATION ($1984) LOSSED PRODUCTIVITY 
M F M F 






(APPENDIX B (ii)) 
An understatement of the true costs of M.H.T. are likely. 
Firstly, pyschic costs deny measurement. These relate to the 
indirect intangible costs ,incurred by victims and their family 
and friends through pain, suffering and mental anguish. The 
asymptomatic nature of M.H.T. would limit this ,hidden cost 
component. 
Secondly, tangible indirect costs also present difficulty 
in quantification. These would include cost of transport to 
medical facilities, ambulatory services and the use of voluntary 
medical labour. The additional years of life generated by 
effective treatment, require additional expenditure on medical 
care. Finally, costs could concievably include built in slack 
for probable inefficiencies in the programme. 
NOTES 
[ 1 ] Information provided by the Medical Research Council 
(U.K.) working party (forthcoming), should redress this 
problem. 
[ 2 ] 6.4 Condition, Treatment in R.F.P.S. [49 p52] 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COSTS OF DETECTION AND TREATMENT 
In costing, a probabilistic approach is followed in 
estimating the number of patients requiring care and specifying 
the linkages between diagnosis, treatment and outcome. Under 
assumptions of average cost, the total cost of each type of 
treatment are obtained. This C.B.A. improves upon previous 
analysis in hypertension costing, which have been based mainly 
in a cost effective framework (C.E.A.). While the level of 
benefits is not set at some pre-determined level, i.e. in say 
quality-adjusted life years saved, the most appropriate 
treatment mix is determined for achieving effective treatment. 
SCREENING 
Many of the C.B.A.'s performed concentrate upon the 
efficacy of alternative screening campaigns for disease, given 
that effective treatment is then obtainable. The results of this 
extensive literature suggest that hypertension detection and 
treatment clinics (mobile or otherwise) are not cost effective. 
Case finding through general practice has been found to be less 
expensive and more efficient than community based screening 
[ 33] • 
A screening campaign is envisaged which makes blood 
pressure reading mandatory on general practitioners (G.P.'s), 
for all patients aged 35-69. A four year program would be 
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implemented, over which 100% coverage of the stock is 
achieved1• Screening of the flow would be ongoing. 
Three separate screening sessions per patient are assumed. 
This is in keeping with PETERSONS findings [36], where less than 
40% initially registering high blood pressure will have it 
confirmed after three sets of readings. 
The possible states of nature at the initial screening are 
NT (Normotensive) or MHT (mildly hypertensive). The initial 
readings can confirm these states when they exist i.e. true 
negative and true positive respectively, or deny these states 
when they actually exist i~e. false negative and false positive 
respectively. 
The central assumptions are:-
(i) There are no false negatives and all false positives 
have exited to the normotensive range by the end of 
the third re-screening2 ; 
(ii) average duration of a visit is 15 minutes; 
(iii) travelling and consultation times result in absence 
from productive activity, valued at the market wage; 
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TABLE S1 
SCREENING (COMMENCING JUN'84) 
UNDISCOUNTED MARGINAL COST 
SCREEN COMPONENTS COST ($) 1984 COMMENT 
NUMBER PATIENT DOCTOR PATIENT DOCTOR 
M $ F 
1 8 mins 8 mins 1.36 0.92 8 in addition to 
15 minutes 
consultation 
2 43 mins 13 mins 7.33 4.92 13 16.5% initially 
M.H.T. ,prove 
false positive 
3A 43 mins 13 mins 7.33 4.92 13 further 16.5% 
prove false 
positive 
3B 15 mins 15 mins 2.56 1.72 25 Doctor costs 
includes $20 
uric acid test. 
1 
note :-full time working· hours 372 hrs. weekly total earnings, 
male 10.23/hr female 6.86/hr, scheduled fee $15 doctor 
consultation. 
Calculations made implicitly equate LRMC with SRMC. We 
assume constant per-unit costs in the industry as a whole. If 
existing firms (surgeries) have already attained an optimal 
size, the increased demand resulting from rescreening (and later 
diagnostic sessions), will lead to an entry of new firms into 
the industry, with identical cost structures. 
The average number of patients per G.P. in Australia was 
estimated at 860 [48]. Follow up screens occur at six monthly 
intervals, the final screen, being twelve months from the 
unrelated visit [34]. 
Thus a G.P. might expect to screen 25% of his 860 patients 
in each of the four years of the program. However, the 
46 
Australian Health Survey [53] suggests that over 70% of people 
see their G.P. within a year. Without the former assumption a 
two year program becomes feasible. However this might introduce 
over-time/penalty rate structures for the G.P.'s in the program 
and over utilization considerations. The average health bill for 
the first year would be very large. Some useful rule of thumb is 
required to adequately model the G.P. medical production 
function. 
Groups considered in discounting are:-
! those found to be normotensive at initial screening, or are 
currently on treatment (the R.F.P.S. [49,p56] indicates 33% 
of males and 61% of females - see Appendix A). 
II those found normotensive at second screening (2) 
III those found to be normotensive at screening (3)A 
IV confirmed positives, the hypertensive stock in (3) B 
In discounting, groups I to IV incur separate time streams 
of costs over the four year period. While any false positives 















We assume 12t~ covE-rage of the stock, semi-annually with 
A§lo.C:' ]ncurrement of total costs. 
TAR IT S2 
GROl' I' .t\ ( ' (JOO) TOTAL DlSCOUKTW COST 
(DR 4%, $ 1984) 
~: 1566.0 28,721,374 
} 1873.1 
ll M 116.00 4,321,836 
F 47.24 
III M 96.86 5,909,642 
F 39.44 




These costs exclude diagnostic tests since these are 
routinely performed only for the more severely H.T. The initial 
screen, is costed over the 8 minutes in which two sets of 
readings are taken as recdommended by DONNER [35]. No other time 
components are relevant, since blood pressure testing is not the 
purpose of the initial visit. Only visits in excess of the 
average number of consultations per episode of illness are 
relevant. 
On-going screening costs of the M.H.T. flow, were 
* n 
calculated using the adjustment factor ~' yielding total 
t 
annual discounted cost of $2,718,318. Again these annual costs 
will occur in perpertuity, prior to effective treatment 
resulting in 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COST 
SCREENING CAMPAIGN (FLOW) 
$67,957,950 
A possibility not explored is the use of nursing staff in 
(re)screening. Lower opportunity cost would be reflected in the 
saving of physcian time. An understatement of screening costs is 
likely with psychic costs incurred by the confirmed mild 
hypertensive. HAYNES [37] finds evidence for increased work 
absenteeism after detection and 'labelling' of hypertensives. 
Effective detection of MHT introduces difficulty in 
accurately attributing future treatment costs to the program. 
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Many persons, would of become aware of their MHT by other means, 
incurring perhaps larger treatment costs from that point 
forward. The program, by accelerating the discovery of MHT, 
should properly, only attribute patient costs for treatment 
costs that would not otherwise have occurred. Total cost is 
3 biased downward • 
COSTS OF TREATMENT 
" ••• unless we can better define those people with mild 
hypertension who will benefit most from therapy, 
community benefit would be bought at the expense of many 
previously symptom free individuals, who would experience 
drug side effects apd expersience no benefit," 
W.H.O. [46,pl55] 
Currently effective control of M.H.T. is obtained largely 
by pharmacological means. Diet modification, specifically the 
'low sodium/high potassium diet' has gained wide-spread 
4 
acceptance in potentiating the need for drug treatment • The 
causal link between salt intake and the development of M.H.T. 
remains a bone of contention in the medical world. This might 
help explain the absence of C.B.A.'s which compare the economic 
performance of diet with drug treatments. This analysis attempts 
to bridge this gap. GRIFFITHS, while alluding to this gap, 
includes non drug treatment in his hyperthetical control 
program. 
We follow the orthodox taxonomy in costs. Direct visible 
costs include drug costs, special dietary costs and screening. 
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Indirect visible costs cover follow up diagnostic care by the 
G.P. 
DRUG TREATMENT 
Calculations are performed on the basis of existing 
treatment priorities. Diuretics (DTl) usually provide the 
primary course of treatment. Beta-Blockers (DT2) are the 'second 
line of defence' drugs. 
Two crucial assumptions are made in costing:-
(i) the 70% ASSUMPTION, which relates to the status quo 
in treatment i.e. that 70% of people initially 
undergo diuretic therapy (DTl). 
(ii) the 20% ASSUMPTION, where only 20% of people 
initially take diuretics. NDT (salt modification) 
becomes the primary source of treatment. 
(see program flowchart following) 
A sensitivity is performed with the alternatives. Other 
5 
assumptions underlying the analysis are constant dosage and 
non-simultaneity in treatment. As with many other aspects of a 
C.B.A. the latter assumption suggests further sensitivity. 
DTl DIURETICS 
A selection of the most commonly prescribed Diuretics and 
Beta Blockers [49] yielded average cost of drug therapy per year 
(JUN'84) prices (Appendix F(ii)) $39.84 per patient/year DTl, 
$94.59 per patient/year DT2 
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s 2 s 3 
Key NT 
probability of following 
route 
screening session 2 
normotensive 
(no hypertension) 
non-adherance to therapy 
general practioner visit 
~ non-drug treatment 
~ drug treatment 1 
0·7/0·2 NOT 
0·2/0·7 DT 1 








10 o/o non- adherance 
DT 1 
50 °/o success of treatment 
. ·. continue therapy 
6 months 
40°/o failure, continue to DT 2 
Assuming 12i% (of the 70%) enter DT1 each six months, 
commencing one year into the screening program. 
A diagnostic session occurs after each initial six monthly 
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course of treatment (see flowchart). Non adherence (NA) is the 
most significant disguised cost. The results are particularly 
sensitive to the choice of this conditional probability. 
WEINSTEIN and STASON [28,p733] assume 33% NA for all drug 
treatments. However 10% was chosen following BRIERS and 
HAWTHORNE [ 6 ,p172] and the AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL BLOOD PRESSURE 
STUDY [29].· The choice of 10% appears realistic given that 
treatment failure (0.40, on flowchart) would include many of 
those who don't adhere to the drug regimen. 20% non-adherance to 
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therapy for Beta-Blockers (DT2) reflects the more adverse side 
effects of this form of treatment. 
DT1 SUCCESSFULLY TREATED (NT) 
The conditional probability is :-
P(DT1/MHT).P(S/DT1) = 0.7.0.5 
This proportion of patients undergo lifelong therapy. We assume 




AGE PROPORTION M F DISCOUNTED DIURETIC COST 
0.7.0.5.0.25 39.84 A 0.04 A n 4l 0.04, 
35-39 5.57 1.22 761.82 809.97 15,402,869 3,586,928 
40-44 6.56 1.52 714.74 771.53 17,019,468 4,256,873 
45-49 5.89 2.39 660.06 726.41 14,075,837 6,301,934 
50-54 7.04 3.05 598.34 674.12 15,290,259 7.463.304 
55-59 6.37 3.23 530.65 614.24 12,269,921 7,201,694 
60-64 5.33 2.93 458.57 546.76 8,872,110 5,815,118 
65-69 4.45 2.46 385.02 472 .so 6,219,241 4,219,209 
89,149,705 38,845,060 
.., $127,994,765 
note :- n, is average life expectancy for age group 
DTl TREATMENT DIAGNOSIS (D) 
The cost of the diagnostic session, 6 months post 
commencement, is 3A+3B less the uric acid test cost $20 (see 
Table Sl) M$37.89, F$34.64. Cost is incurred by the 50% 
successfully treated and the 40% for whom it is discovered 
during diagnosis that DTl has been a failure. 
Using annuities, with 25% diagnosed each year, total 
discounted diagnostic costs are shown in table D2, combined with 
costs incurred for 6 months by treatment failures. 
DISCOUNTED DIAGNOSTIC 





DT1 NON-ADHERANCE (NA) 
DISCOUNTED TOTAL COSTS 




Non-adherance is most relevant to benefit calculations, in 
that costs incurred are the same but benefits are not recieved 
(or perhaps only partially) 7 • Classification was based upon 
PETERSON'S findings 
(i) early dropouts; incurring 3 months treatment (30%) 
(ii) partial compliers (missing one or more doses per 
month; incurring lifelong treatment costs (70%). 
PETERSON's finding that partial compliers received only 45% of 
the benefits of treatment, suggests an overstatement of B/C 
ratios calculated. The conditional probabilities are :-
partial compliers 
P(DTl/MHT) P(NA/DT1) P(PC/NA) = 0.7.0.10.0.7 
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early drop outs 
P(DTl/MHT) P(NA/DTl) P(ED/NA) 0.7.0.10.0.3 
(see Appendix B(ii)) 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS DR 4% 
EARLY DROPOUTS AND PARTIAL COMPLIERS 
M F 
12;459. 078 5,418,534 
$ 17,877,612 
ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS 
Most side-effects of diuretic hyptotensive drugs, are 
mild, asymptotic and ge'nerally require no treatment. However 
side-effects do account for a significant component of non-
adherance. Hypokalaemia in diuretic therapy is ameliorated by 
use of 'potassium sparing' diuretics at comparable annual cost 8 • 
DT2 BETA BlOCKERS 
This course of treatment is casted in the same way as for 
DT1. Tables of discounted costs are not presented here in the 
interests of brevity (see Appendix G). 
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DT1 TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS OF TREATMENT ($ 1984) 




20% NON-ADHERANCE (PARTIAL 
















Failures from DT1 are also casted through Beta-Blocker 
treatment allowance being made in present value calculations for 
time lags in effective treatment. (see Appendix H) 
NON DRUG TREATMENT 
The medical literature suggests that the average 
Australian consumes four times the daily requirement of salt, 
consistent with the maintainence of satisfactory blood pressure 
levels i.e. 1150m.g.[31,p3] daily. The addition of salt to food 
can be regarded as irrational, due to market failures in 
information. It is then a legitimate consideration in C.B.A. 
Salt is viewed as a derived demand for a factor (part of 
the production function of diet). Demand is price inelastic 
since it comprises only a small proportion of the total cost of 
provision. People are willing to pay relatively high prices for 
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salt substitute products (under the orthodox assumption of 
constant tastes). 
Costs of the NDT 'no added-salt' diet are composed of 
(i )" ••• increased consulation and monitoring activity of 
such intervention" [36,p230]. Specifically diagnostic 
sessions at 2,3,6 and 12 months are assumed. 
(ii) consumer willingness to pay for decreases in blood 
pressure. The assumption is of perfect information, 
provided by diagnostic sessions. The patient is aware 
of salt in all foods (processed or otherwise), and 
the need for 'reduction in salt intake to achieve 
normal B.P. levels. 
Thus the average consumer, in reducing daily salt 
consumption by 4 grams daily pays:-
1.89 9 
O.ZS .4 I day 
-3c I day 
-$10.95 I year 
This value would understate the true cost of a salt free 
diet due to:-
(iii) opportunity cost considerations with indirect 
tangible costs, reflected in the higher priced salt-free 
products, currently marketed (with small scale production). 
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By altering current lifestyle the patient is altering his 
wage earning capacity, and investing in his own human capital. 
However modification of behaviour paterns are also likely to 
include reducing obesity, cessation of smoking, low cholesterol 
diets etc. Thus salt diet, is one of many possible investments 
in health, that could be recommended in NDT [30]. 
75% success rate for salt diet modification is used, 
following MORGAN and MYERS [41] 10% non-adherance is consistent 
with PETERSON's [36,p3] findings in NDT compliance (see Appendix 
I for age sex breakdown of discounted costs under the 20% 
assumption). 
NDT failures are casted through DTl and DT2 (see Appendix 
J) 
FlOW CONSIDERATIONS 
As outlined previously costing of the flow, uses stock 
n discounted cost figures. Adjustment by * yielding total annual 
Nt 
discounted costs occurring in perpetuity (Appendices, K and L). 
NOTES 
[ 1 ] In a 5 year program, 20% per year screened was assumed by 
BRYERS [6] 
2 Three screens recommended in STOKES [45] 
3 A problem explicitly recognized in MAYO CLINICAL PROC [33] 
4 By FREIS, BEARD, KAPLAN and others [32,31,39] 
5 Dosage is often increased until a satisfactory level of 
blood pressure is achieved. 
6 Though usually left to the G.P.'s discretion. 
7 This phenomenon was not taken into account in calculation 
of benefits 
8 'MIDAMOR' AMILORIDE, treatment $34.70/year [50] 





PROGRAM AGGREGATE (DT1, DT2, NDT, SCREENING) 
RESULTS (BENEFIT/COST) 
D.R. 70% ASSUMPTION ' 20% ASSUMPTION 
4% 2.3822 3.7692 
2% 1.7214 3.3029 
3% 2.1251 4.0420 
6% 2.9333 5.6770 
10% 3.5151 5.6510 
(see APPENDIX M1 )' 
' PROGRAM BY AGE AND SEX (DTl,DT2,NDT,SCREENING) 
RESULTS (BENEFIT/COST, NET BENEFIT) 
M F M F 
35-39 0.3696 0.4514 0.5303 0.5327 
$ -62,692,073 -25,977,087 1 -32,557,825 -18,751,676 
45-49 1.8888 0.9678 2.8865 1.3157 
$ 90,688,570 -1,744,436 I 125,952,943 12,587,776 
55-59 5.1494 1.4285 7.9092 2.2053 
$ 516,468,112 34,031,680 I 559 J 900 J 340 62,005,431 
65-69 1.6075 0.4733 2.4287 0.7002 
$ 67,115,575 -38,580,017 : 104,446,839 -14,841,883 
REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND SENSITIVITY 
The main sources of imprecision in estimates obtained 
relate to changes in productivity, development of new drugs, and 
labour fource participation rates. These sources would effect 
stock mortality and flow estimates particularly. Probabilities 
used in specifying links, between diagnosis, treatment and 
outcomes are at best indicative. 
A sensitivity was performed to test for fragility in the 
choice and ranking of alternative mixes in treatment. Discount 
1 
rates varying from 2 to 10 percent were used • 
The results suggest that overall emplementation of the 
program, is not dependent upon the choice of assumption (70 or 
20 percent) or discount rate. Ideally sensitivity would be 
performed on adherance rates, the major source of undertainty in 
treatment effectiveness. 
Benefit/cost ratios are calculated under a full benefit 
assumption i.e. that alternative mixes of DT1, DT2 and NTD will 
successfully control M.H.T. in the target population. 
Conditional probabilities yield 2.5% and 1% failure rates under 
the 70 and 20 percent assumptions respectively. Thus benefit 
estimates are likely to be overstated. Net benefit is calculated 
as a means of ranking interventions by age groups. 
In the aggregate social costs are outweighed by social 
benefits, reflected by the large ratios. A program, based on 
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NDT, salt-diet modification, as the primary treatment yields 
higher benefit (20% assumption). At the disaggregated level, no 
program is justified for those in the 35-39 year age group. Any 
treatment mix appears desirable for 45-59 year age group. Though 
diuretic (DTl) therapy is marginally rejected for females of 45-
49, as a primary course of therapy. The program, should ideally 
be directed only at males in 65-69 age group, with the emphasis 
on N.D.T. treatment. Only a selection of age groups are 
calculated. However, net benefit figures indicate the program 
would maximize social benefit by screening and treating middle-
aged males, with primary treatment in N.D.T. 
The findings of this cost-benefit analysis largely confirm 
the trend in medical opinion, that treatment of persons with 
mildly elevated blood pressure is justified. 
"Applying optimal treatment to the large proportion of the 
population with mild hypertension could involve mass 
medication on a scale never before contemplated. This 
possibility has •• encouraged efforts to evaluate non-drug 
treatment ••• [and] the most effective methods of 
identifying hypertensive individuals in the community." 
[JOHN J. McNEIL MB.B.S., MSc (EPIDEMIOC) PH.D RESEARCH 
FELLOW, NATIONAL HEART FOUNDATION OF AUSTRALIA MARCH 1984 
IN "THE COST OF UNTREATED HYPER TENS ION.] 
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NOTES 
[ 1 ] Annual stock costs were not recaluclated with alternative 
D.R.'s before sensitivity on the flow. 
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APPENDIX A (I) 
MI ill HYPERTENSIVE STOCK 
AGE TOTAL % TOTAL MilD lESS lESS 
GROUP POPUlATION HYPERTENSIVE HYPERTENSIVE CURRENTLY SCERENING 
('000) MEDICATED ERROR 33% 
M F M F M F M F M F 
35-39 503.6 486.0 28.15 10.95 141.76 53.22 94.98 20.75 63.64 13.90 
40-44 427.5 406.8 39.08 16.32 167.07 66.39 111.94 25.89 75.00 17.35 
45-49 377.3 357.5 39.75 29.17 149.98 104.28 100.49 40.67 67.33 27.25 
50-54 394 .1 397.2 45.48 35.17 179.24 133.36 120.09 52.01 80.46 34.85 
55-59 369.8 370.9 43.87 38.11 162.23 141.35 108.69 55.13 72.82 36.94 
60-64 292 .6 321.4 46.39 39.79 135.74 127.89 90.95 49.88 60.44 33.42 
65-69 250.4 285.4 45.24a 37.69a 113.28 107.57 75.90 41.95 50.85 28.11 
703.04 286.28 471.64 191.82 
662.80 
SOURCES : National Heart Foundation of Australia Risk Factor Prevalence Study Nol 
1980 p 26-33, Year Book Australia 1984, No 68 A.B.S. p87-116. 
a complete figures not available, postulated mean age group 50-64 
APPENDIX A(ii) 
FlDW MORTALITY lDSSES $ 
AGE ANNUALLY (FI.DW.PV LIFETIME I.DSSES)/D.R. 
M F M F 
35 51 9 499,188 25,994 
36 66 9 669,768 26,980 
37 64 14 671,392 43,421 
38 74 14 800,329 44,821 
39 85 18 945,115 59,315 
40 110 23 1,254,055 77.798 
41 125 27 1,457,688 93,526 
42 138 32 1,642,028 113,320 
43 156 32 1,889,784 115,528 
44 177 37 2,178,206 135,929 
45 177 64 2,207,544 238,704 
46 194 73 2,449,347 275,885 
47 215 82 2,741,734 313,322 
48 238 91 3,059,193 305,737 
49 261 100 3,374,404 388,100 
50 346 137 4,488,918 534,129 
51 379 l51 4,923,410 589,994 
52 412 160 5,345,288 625,280 
53 458 174 5,934,650 678,426 
54 502 187 6,465,509 725,513 
55 496 219 6,326,108 843,807 
56 550 241 6,944,300 919,957 
57 607 265 7,521,034 993,353 
58 668 292 8,056,247 1,064,486 
59 737 324 8,570,757 1,136,997 
60 678 320 7,520,885 1,067,680 
61 744 352 7,823,904 1.116. 720 
62 816 383 8,026,176 1,139,329 
63 896 416 8,105,888 1,140,776 
64 977 452 7,956,200 1,118,022 
65 888 415 6,324,336 899,984 
66 967 452 5,781,935 824,448 
67 1052 498 4,953,868 716,498 
68 1144 539 3,781,206 545,064 
69 1254 593 2,214,251 320,961 
TOTAL 16692 7195 152,904,445 19,303,840 
$172,208,285 
APPENDIX B (i) 
ANNUAL PROBABILITY OF DEATH DUE M.H.T. 
AGE PERSONS FREQUENCY HEART _0-i) 
GROUP SURVIVING ALL CAUSES DISEASE [ (i) ].0.60 
1982(i) DEATHS (ii) /STROKE 
FATALITIES (iii) 
M 2174.5 3,654 lf42 0.00012195 
25-44 
F 2106.5 1 '725 96 0.0000273 
M 1433.8 15,493 6,217 0.0026016 
45-64 
F 1429.0 8' 153 2,317 0.0009728 
M 613.5 17,869 7,983 0.0078073 
65-74 
F 841.8 10,684 4,685 0.00333927 
SOURCE:- DEATHS, AUSTRALIA 1982 











































































APPENDIX B (II) 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS 








































































































































































SOURCE : Risk factor prevalence study, N.H.F. NO 1 1980. 
+ appears to be large discrepancy between these figures 
(adjusted 60% MHT related) and A.N.B.P.S. estimates of 
incidence, possibly due to defining narrower range of Blood 
pressure as MHT. 
APPENDIX D 
MORBIDITY 
SENSITIVITY, FUTURE TREATMENT COSTS/FIRST YEAR TREATMENT 
COSTS 
HARTUNIAN PRINCIPlE PRESENT VAlliE ANNUITY 
DATA($M) 
MI 974/459 67.5 551 526 502 459 
STROKE 1526/740 97.0 911 862 819 740 
DR 6% 6% 2% 3% 4% 6% 
RATIO MI 974/551 974/526 974/502 974/459 
STROKE 1526/911 1526/862 1526/819 1526/740 









































































1.3 months absence from work 


























APPENDIX F (i) 
SCREENING DISCOUNTING 
e.g. II first finding annual present values 
20.33 M 9.36 + (1•02 ) = 29.29 
17.92 
F 8.92 + (l.02) = 26.49 
12t% of people in this group making these 6 monthly 
payments over 4 years 
TOTAL COSTS 
M 14.5 ('000) 43,550 
12.!_ 




APPENDIX F (ii) 
HYPOTENSIVE DRUGS 
DIURETICS COST $ BETA-B l.OCKERS COST $ 
NAME (BRAND) NAME (BRAND) 
AMILORIDE (MIDAMOR) 2.89 ALPRENOLOL 5.69 
CENDROFllJAZIDE ATENOLOL (TENORMIN) 9.54 
(APRINOX) 2.81 
CH LOROTH IAZ IDE METOPROLOL 6.98 
(CH LOTRIDE) 2.95 
CHLOROTHACIDONE OXYPRENOLOL 7.73 
(HYGROTON) 2.57 
CYCLOPEWTHAZIDE PINDOLOL 8.53 
(MAVIDREX) 2.81 
FRUSEMIDE (LASIX) 2. 77 PRUPRANOLOL 7.69 
HYDROCHLOROTHAZIDE 3.41 TIMOLOL 8.53 
MElli Y C LO'lliAZ IDE 2.84 
MODURETIC 3,76 
DYACIDE 4.70 
x = $3.29 x = 7.81 
$39.48 Per patient/year $93.74 per patient/year 
source 'PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS' AUGUST 1984 
SCHEDULE OF PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS FOR APPROVED 
CHEMISTS : COMMONWLTH DEPT HEAL'lli, A.C.T. 
COST IS N.H.S. FOR 30 DAYS TREATMENT AVERAGE DOSE, 
APRIL '84 PRICES 
DOSES c COSTS MORE VARIABLE FOR BETA-BLOCKER 
APPENDIX G 
DT 2 BETA-BLOCKER 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS OF TREATMENT 












































compliers + early dropouts) 
152,536 338' 155 199,634 39,768 
1,607,912 401,502 235,127 49,778 
1,334,213 594,471 211,100 78,080 
1,455,127 705,063 252,208 99,795 
1,160,799 681,033 228,457 105,895 
940,797 549,222 191,089 95,893 
590,296 400,057 159,329 80,517 




DT2(DT1), BETA-BLOCKER TREATMENT 
OF DT1 FAILURES 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS OF TREATMENT 
AGE 21% successful treatment 
35-39 21,936,081 5,094,075 
40-44 24,254,372 6,056,618 
45-49 20,108,023 8,956,240 
50-54 21,782,584 10,629,596 
55-59 17,482,734 10,266,251 
60-64 12,643,981 8,267,591 










































NDT, NON DRUG TREATMENT 
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COSTS (20% ASSUMPTION) 





















































54' 77 5, 217 
APPENDIX J 
I DTl (NDT) DIURETIC TREATMENT NDT FAIIlJRES 
II DT2 (NDT) BETA-BlOCKER TREATMENT NDT FAILURES FROM DT1 
20% ASSUMPTION 






















































* FLDW DRUG TREATMENT COSTS (N ) 
ANNUAL COSTS, DISCOUNTED M1 F 
• 
AGE DT1 successful DTl diagnosis DT1 failures 
35-39 79,883 16,498 6,933 1,236 1,606 311 
40-44 160,209 37,064 14,848 2,909 3,436 735 
45-49 252,194 94,795 22,794 7,893 5,280 1,995 
50-54 298,519 173,215 44 '100 15,576 10,206 3,938 
55-59 515,202 261,418 64,332 25,775 14,882 6,524 
60-64 598,483 334,571 86,420 36,917 20,002 9,359 
65-69 648,742 374,732 111,373 47,899 25,821 12,150 
2,653,232 1,292,239 350,800 138,205 81,233 35,012 
3,945,471 489,005 116,245 
AGE DT1 nonadherance DT2 successful DT2 diagnosis 
35-59 11 , 136 2,296 40,616 8,389 1,635 183 
40-44 22,364 5 '161 81,526 20,370 2,213 433 
45-49 31,754 13,196 115 '778 29,765 3,402 1,175 
50-54 55,636 24' 184 202,840 50,844 6,573 2,317 
55-59 72,054 36,539 262,323 65,723 9,594 3,844 
60-64 83,817 46,693 364 '728 77,530 12,890 5,517 
65-69 90,985 52,430 33,255 190,630 16,622 7' 152 
367,746 180,499 1,388,030 443,251 53,329 20,621 
548,250 1,781,281 72,950 
AGE DT2 nonadherance DT2 failures DT2(DT1) successful 
35-39 790 1,557 68 13 111,517 22,995 
40-44 15,136 3,494 147 31 223,838 51,678 
45-49 21,501 8,944 226 85 317,380 132,112 
S0-54 37,664 16,367 437 168 556,580 241,915 
55-59 48,746 24,721 637 279 719,774 365,379 
60-6/i 56,720 31,596 856 400 836,236 466,309 
65-69 61,581 35,536 1,104 520 906,051 523,364 
242,138 122,215 3,476 1,498 3,671,676 1,803,752 
36,267 4,974 5,475,428 
AGE DT2(DT1) non DT2(DT1)diagnosis DT2 (DTl) failures 
adherance 
35-39 21,669 4,386 2,678 565 1,879 365 
40-44 43,551 10,529 5,730 1,193 4,636 863 
45-49 61,918 25,695 8,806 3,238 6,203 2,344 
S0-54 108,835 26,222 17,020 6,390 11,989 4,625 
55-59 141,082 71,338 24,820 10,591 17,483 7,667 
60-64 164,646 91,323 31,311 15,185 23,504 10,992 
65-69 179,515 102,944 43,058 19,722 30,330 14,276 
721,216 353,344 133,423 56,824 95,429 41,132 
1,075,560 190,247 136,536 
APPENDIX 1 
FLOW NON DRUG TREATMENT COSTS 
ANNUAL, DIS COUNTED 
AGE NDT DIAGNOSTIC 
35-39 27,838 5,119 
40-44 59,561 11,794 
45-49 91,540 32,029 
50-54 176,912 63,202 
55-59 258,004 164,739 
60-64 346,801 150,141 
































































































23,760 13' 711 



































l ,313 453 
2,536 894 
3,726 1,483 


























screening(S) 90,199,913 90,199,913 
DTl (S) success 127,994,764 36,569,931 
failure 3,225,822 921,663 
non-adherance 17,877,612 5,050,106 
diagnosis 13,696,418 3,913,262 
DT2 (S) success 58,351,796 16,671,942 
failure 138,015 39,433 
non-adherance 12,102,392 3,457,826 
diagnosis 2,026,670 579,049 
DT2(DT1' success 275,892,934 50,255,124 
failure 3,788,425 1,082,407 
non-adherance 34,952,809 9,986,517 
diagnosis 5,338,237 1,525,210 
NDT(S) success 14,906,055 52,171,192 
failure 197,601 691,605 
non-adherance 2,807,492 9,826,221 
diagnosis 15,650,062 54' 775,217 
DTl(NDT) success 5,274,510 18,460,784 
failure 132,932 465,263 
non-ad hera nee 728,381 2,549,333 
diagnosis 564,313 1,975,445 
DT2(NDT) success 643,258 2,251,403 
failure 15,312 53,593 
non-adherance 1,334,154 4,669,539 
diagnosis 223!418 781!962 
SUB-TOTAlS 588!063,395 368!923!940 
(F) lOW 
screening(F) 67,957,950 67,957,950 
DTl(F) success 98,636,777 28,181,936 
failure 2,906,125 830,321 
non-adherance 13,706,125 3,916,036 
diagnosis 12,225,125 3,492,893 
DT2(F) success 44,532,025 12,723,436 
failure 124,350 35,529 
non-adherance 9,056,675 2,587,621 
diagnosis 1,823,750 521,071 
DT2 (DTl) success 136,885,700 39,110,199 
failure 3,413,900 975,400 
non-adherance 28,864,000 8,246,857 
diagnosis 4. 7 56,175 1,358,907 
NDT(F) success 11 ,544, 786 40,406,750 
failure 178,021 623,075 
non-adherance 2,318,886 8,816,100 
diagnosis 14,090,821 49,317,875 
DTl(NDT) success 4,064,707 14,226,475 
failure 119.750 419,125 
non-adherance 564,814 1,976,850 
diagnosis 523,928 1,833,750 
DT2(NDT success 701,300 2,454,550 
failure 13,700 47,950 
non-adherance 1,012,670 3,544,375 
diagnosis 201 !043 703!650 
SUB-TOTAlS 460,223,112 293,608,681 
TOTAL 1,048,286,507 662,532,621 
BENEFIT 2.3822 3.7692 
COST 
SENSITIVITY D.R. 
2% l. 7214 3.3029 
3% 2.1251 4.0420 
6% 2.9333 5.6770 
10% 3.5151 5,6510 
a 
read as 'failures from DTl entering DT2' 
APPENDIX M2 













STOCK M F 
screening (S) 18,822,304 18,190,097 
DTI (S) 19,197,384 4,421,502 
DT2(S) 8,190,145 2,201,020 
DT2(DT1) 26,741,145 8,379,448 
NDT(S) 3,610,519 803,340 
DTl (NDT) 1,009,739 227,665 
DT2(NDT) 102,003 27,225 
SUB-TOTAL 77,673,239 32,049,277 
FlDW 
screening (F) 14,181,002 13,704,688 
DTT1(F) 2,488953 508,522 
DT2(F) 1,062,742 253,558 
DT2(DT1) 3,443,575 706,275 
NDT(F) 477,150 93,365 
DTl(NDT) 102,858 20,999 
DT2(NDT) 21,208 14,964 
SUB-TOTAL 21,777,488 15,302,381 
TOTAL 99,450,727 47,351,658 
NET BENEFIT -62,692,073 -25,977,087 
BENEFIT/COST 0.3696 0.4514 
NOTE: Costs presented are the aggregate 
diagnosis. DT1(S) refers duiretic 
M F 






























of success, failure, non -adherance and 
treatment of stock (F) for flow. 
AGE GROUP 45-49 
BENEFITS :-
M F 
mortality(S) 34,274,875 4,156,226 
morbidity (S) hospitalization 47,947,554 14,424,168 
future treatment 23,973,777 7,212,084 
productivity 68,768,522 23,363,954 
mortality (F) 13,832,222 1,566,748 
morbidity (F) hospitalization 1,336,676 375,445 
future treatment 668,338 750,890 
productivity 1,917,120 608,138 
TOTAlS 192,719,084 54,457,653 
COSTS . 
70% ASSUMPTION 20% ASSUMPTION 
STOCK M F M F 
screening(S) 13,178,334 12,583,324 13,178,334 12,583,324 
DTl (S) 17,788,439 7,836,182 5,082,410 2,238,909 
DT2(S) 8,743,871 2,656,503 2,498,277 850,000 
DT2(DT1) 24,649,407 9,931,758 7,042,686 3,123,361 
NDT(S) 3,607,016 1,482,001 12,624,557 5,187,008 
DTl (NDT) 960,178 410,501 3,360,621 1,436,751 
DT2(NDT) 108,764 33,431 380,672 117,009 
SUB-TOTAL 69,024,109 35,033,700 44,167,557 25,445,362 
FIDW 
screening (F) 9,928,752 9,480,462 9,928,752 9,480,462 
DTT1 (F) 7,799,431 2,946,968 2,228,408 841,991 
DT2 (F) 3,522,671 999,234 1,006,478 285,495 
DT2(DT1) 9,865,175 4,084,725 2,818,621 1,167,065 
NDT(F) 1,453,149 557,457 5,086,025 1,951,100 
DT1 (NDT) 322,385 120,464 1,128,350 421,625 
DT2(NDT) 114,842 79,079 401,950 276,775 
SUB-TOTAL 33,006,405 18,268,389 22,598,584 14,424,515 
TOTAL 102,030,514 54,202,089 66,766,141 39,869,877 
NET BENEFIT 90,688,570 -1,744,436 125,952,943 12,587 '776 
BENEFIT/COST 1.8888 0.9678 2.8865 1.3157 
AGE GROUP 55-59 
BENEFITS :-
M F 
mortality (S) 35,812,148 5,488,842 
morbidity (S) hospitalization 173,856,274 40,770,840 
future treatment 86,928,137 20,385,420 
productivity 249,805,241 32,762,280 
mortality (F) 37,418,446 4,958,600 
morbidity (F) hospitalization 19,448,204 3,942,664 
future treatment 9,724,102 1,971,332 
productivity 27,944,136 3,168,212 
TOTAlS 640,936,688 113,448,190 
COSTS ·-. 
70% ASSUMPTION 20% ASSUMPTION 
STOCK M F M F 
screening(S) 12,867,896 12,836,293 12,867,896 12,836,293 
DT1 (S) 3,614,416 9,097,959 4,534,877 2,599,415 
DT2 (S) 7,651,106 2,605,053 2,186,030 744,301 
DT2(DT1) 21,958,575 12,734,332 6,233,879 3,638,381 
NDT(S) 3,512,252 1,837,872 12,292,881 6,432,551 
DT1(NDT) 894,417 490,996 3,130,464 1,718,486 
DT2(NDT) 95,963 33,366 355,873 116,782 
SUB-TOTAL 62,8522,309 39,635,870 41,581,900 28,086,209 
FLOW 
screening(F) 9,694,863 9,671,053 9,694,863 9,671,053 
DTT1(F) 16,661,748 8,256,395 4,760,499 2,358,970 
DT2(F) 8,032,494 2,364,181 2,294,999 675,481 
DT2(DT1) 22,578,975 11,374,375 6,454,137 3,249,821 
NDT(F) 3,687,336 1,667,972 12,905,675 5,837,900 
DTl (NDT) 694,601 341,292 2,412,400 1,194,525 
DT2(NDT) 266,250 105,372 931,875 368,800 
SUB-TOTAL 61,616,267 39,780,640 39,454,448 23,356,550 
TOTAL 124,468,576 79,416,510 81,036,348 51,442,759 
NET BENEFIT 516,468,576 34,031,680 559,900,340 62,005,431 
BENEFIT/COST 5.1494 1.4285 7.9092 2.2053 
AGE GROUP 65-69 
BENEFITS :-
M F 
mortality(S) 9,308,073 1,570,446 
morbidity (S) hospitalization 24,244,406 7,751,311 
future treatment 12,122,203 3,875,656 
productivity 28,484,463 5,487,034 
mortality (F) 23,055,596 3,306,955 
morbidity(F) hospitalization 33,526,057 5,741,404 
future treatment 16,763,029 2,870,702 
productivity 39,389,364 4,064,252 
TOTALS 177,585,118 34,667,760 
COSTS :-
70% ASSUMPTION 20% ASSUMPTION 
STOCK M F M F 
screening (S) 8,636,125 9,873,832 8,636,125 9,873,832 
DT1 (S) 8,406,404 5,485,452 2,472,543 1,567,272 
DT2 (S) 3,925,782 2,632456 3,754,108 752,130 
DT2(DT1) 12 ,295,370 ' 8,238,298 3,512,963 2,353,800 
NDT(S) 2,147,220 2,242,465 7,515,267 4,398,628 
DTl (NDT) 509,596 311,893 1,783,599 1,091,626 
DT2(NDT) 50,007 33,192 175,027 116,176 
SUB-TOTAL 35,970,504 27,817,591 25,146,452 20,103,460 
FLOW 
scr;ening(F) 6,506,565 7,439,085 6,506,565 7,439,085 
DTTl(F) 21,923,028 12,180,281 6,263,722 3,480,081 
DT2(F) 10,239,067 5,845,949 2,925,447 1,670,272 
DT2 (DTl) 28,973,850 16,507,650 8,278,245 4,716,470 
NDT(F) 5,599,929 2,759,193 19,599,750 9,657,178 
DTl(NDT) 908,015 503,906 3,178,050 1,763,675 
DT2(NDT) 348,505 194,122 1,220,050 679,425 
SUB-TOTAL 74,499,039 45,430,186 47,971,827 29,406,183 
TOTAL 110,469,543 73,247.777 73,118,279 49,509,643 
NET BENEFIT 67,115,575 -38,580,017 104,466,839 -14,841,883 
BENEFIT/COST 1.6075 0.4733 2.4287 0.7002 
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